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ESSAY

Two Examples of “Quasi-Constitutional
Amendments” From the Italian
Constitutional Evolution—A Response to
Richard Albert
NICOLA LUPO†

In response to Richard Albert’s Quasi-Constitutional Amendments,
65 BUFF. L. REV. 739 (2017).

INTRODUCTION

Richard Albert’s theoretical proposal in his article is at
the same time innovative and challenging, especially when it
aims to define a new category of constitutional phenomena:
“quasi-constitutional amendments.”1 He defines these quasiconstitutional
amendments
as
“sub-constitutional
alteration[s] to the operation of a set of existing norms in the
constitution.”2 Albert analyzes this phenomenon in context
of the jurisdiction of Canada, and shows how it derives from
the difficulty of formal constitutional amendment there. 3 He
draws a couple of rather recent examples from that
jurisdiction: the Regional Veto Law and the new process for
Senate appointment.4 Both show the ability to successfully
achieve constitutional change through non-constitutional
means.
† Full Professor of Public Law, LUISS University, Rome, Italy.

1. Richard Albert, Quasi-Constitutional Amendments, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 739,
740. (2017).
2. Id.

3. See id. at 739.

4. See id. at 745, 748.
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Moving beyond the Canadian experience, Albert
maintains that the category of quasi-constitutional
amendments is potentially transferrable to any legal order,
with or without a written constitution, and provides
examples from the United States and Australia,5 as well as
the parallel concept of “constitutional statutes” in the United
Kingdom.6 According to Albert, moreover, the category seems
to be growing, and looks especially well-suited for matters of
constitutional structure, where it is more difficult to change
the meaning of the constitution through judicial
interpretation.7
In this contribution, I will respond with some references
to the concrete experience of the Italian legal order in
different phases of its historical evolution with a flexible as
well as rigid constitution. I will quote a couple of examples
and an academic debate on similar concepts. The aim is to
demonstrate the qualities of Albert’s new category while, at
the same time, showing that the phenomena to which it
refers are far from recent. Additionally, I seek to
demonstrate that Albert’s new category raises, by definition,
a number of controversies that Albert himself acknowledges.

Specifically, I will address two examples of quasiconstitutional amendments. The first occurred at the time of
the Albertine Statute—which was conceded in 1848 by King
Charles Albert of Savoy and considered a flexible
constitution—and concerned the form of government. The
letter of the Albertine Statute stated in article five that the
executive power was vested in the king alone—laying out a
constitutional monarchy with a division-of-powers system.
Rather soon after its entry into force, however, the influence
of the elected Chamber of Deputies and the autonomy of the
Prime Minister transformed the form of government, which,
mainly due to the influence of parliamentary rules and
5. See id. at 743.
6. Id. at 744.

7. Id. at 744–45.
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practices, gradually evolved towards a quasi-parliamentary
and then a parliamentary system. The second occurred
during the era of the Constitution of the Italian Republic—
which took effect in 1948 as a rigid constitution assisted by a
centralized system of judicial review of legislation—and
concerned ratification and execution of the international
treaties of the newly founded European Community and
their subsequent reforms. The constitution, as in all the
other Member States of the European Union, prevailed over
national—even
constitutional—norms
and
deeply
transformed the Italian Constitution. In Italy, this
ratification—given the impossibility of reaching the high
parliamentary majority required for a proper constitutional
amendment—did not happen through any constitutional
amendment. Rather, it took place through ordinary statutes
and reliance on a general clause embedded in article eleven
of the Italian Constitution which addressed the openness to
the international order and the consequent limitations of
sovereignty.

A relevant academic debate among Italian constitutional
law scholars on forms of quasi-constitutional amendments
had already emerged in the 1950s, although in a slightly
different category, defined more generally—especially by
Pierandrei and Tosi—as “tacit constitutional modifications.”8
This debate focused precisely on the main risks of the
category that Albert defines: creating “a mismatch between
constitutional design and political practice” and, ultimately,
undermining “the constitution itself and the very purpose of
codification.”9 These risks are why Albert’s category, as well
as the similar notion of “constitution in a material sense”10—
very commonly used in the Italian academic and political
debate—should be handled with extreme care and caution,
8. FRANCO PIERANDREI, La Corte Costituzionale e le ‘Modificazioni Tacite’
della Costituzione, in 4 SCRITTI GIURIDICI IN ONORE DI A. SCIALOJA, 315 (1953).
9. Id. at 742.

10. Costantino Mortati, La Costituzione in Senso Materiale (1998).
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I. FIRST EXAMPLE: THE PARLIAMENTARIZATION OF THE FORM
OF GOVERNMENT PROVIDED BY THE ALBERTINE STATUTE

The first reported example of quasi-constitutional
amendment occurred with regards to the Albertine Statute
of 1848’s reference to the Kingdom of Sardinia and Piedmont,
which lasted for almost a century—though interrupted by a
fascist regime—prior to the current Italian Constitution. The
Albertine Statute was the only one among the other charters
enacted in the Italian peninsula in 1848–49 to survive the
repression that came to pass in all the other States since
1849. It permitted the Kingdom of Sardinia and Piedmont to
become leader of the “Risorgimento.” In 1861, the unification
process, led by the King of Savoy (Victor Emmanuel II,
Charles Albert’s first son) and his Prime Minister (Camillo
Benso, Count of Cavour), was solidified and the Albertine
Statute became the fundamental charter of the Kingdom of
Italy.

This document was not given the name of “Constitution”
because that term evoked the French Revolution and its
attendant traumatic events such as the constituent
assemblies that were being convened in Paris in those very
months. “‘[S]tatute’ was a more neutral term, which recalled
the Italian municipal tradition.”11 However, independently
from its name, in all respects the Albertine Statute was a
classic example of a constitution of a liberal modern State. It
was formally “conceded” on March 4, 1848 by the king “with
regal loyalty and fatherly love.”12 Thus, Italian scholarship
11. Sabino Cassese, The Italian Constitutional Architecture: from Unification
to the Present Day, Paper delivered at the International Conference on The
Unification of Italy and American Independence (Sept. 20, 2011),
http://www.irpa.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/The-Italian-ConstitutionalArchitecture.pdf.

12. Statuto Albertino (It.), translated in S.M. LINDSAY & L.S. ROWE,
CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF ITALY, TRANSLATED AND SUPPLIED WITH AN
INTRODUCTION AND NOTES 272 (1984) (quoted text translated from Italian).
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usually speaks of a “charte octroyée” as opposed to those
constitutions that are approved by the people by way of
popular vote, constituent assembly, or convention.13

The Albertine Statute declared itself “perpetual and
irrevocable.”14 However, as it did not provide for any special
procedure for its revision, it was soon deemed to be a
“flexible” constitution—that is, not hierarchically superior to
ordinary legislation—although it probably was originally
conceived as an unamendable or petrified constitution.15 In
any case, throughout its rather long history the Albertine
Statute has never been amended, although many of its
provisions were indeed waived or implicitly repealed.
One of the most relevant cases of implicit constitutional
change involves the rules on a key feature of this
constitution: the form of government—i.e., the rules
regarding the distribution of power—or, more precisely, the
allocation of the power of “general political direction” (the socalled “indirizzo politico”) among constitutional bodies or
branches of the government.
Similar to many constitutions conceded in continental
Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the
Albertine Statute elaborated a constitutional monarchy
which designed, in general terms, a so-called pure
constitutional system. This means that the form of
government was a “division of power system,” in which the
executive depended exclusively on the king, who derived his
legitimacy from God. In this system, the legislative power
was vested in the Parliament, with a house appointed by the
king—i.e., the Government—and another elected by a

13. See PAOLO COLOMBO, CON LEALTÀ DI RE E CON AFFETTO DI PADRE: TORINO,
4 MARZO 1848: LA CONCESSIONE DELLO STATUTO ALBERTINO (2003) 49.

14. Statuto Albertino (It.), translated in S.M. LINDSAY & L.S. ROWE,
CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF ITALY, TRANSLATED AND SUPPLIED WITH AN
INTRODUCTION AND NOTES 274 (1984).

15. See ALESSANDRO PACE, LA CAUSA DELLA RIGIDITÀ COSTITUZIONALE: UNA
RILETTURA DI BRYCE, DELLO STATUTO ALBERTINO E DI QUALCHE ALTRA
COSTITUZIONE (1996).
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limited popular suffrage. Indeed, according to article five of
the Albertine Statute, the executive power was vested in the
King alone.16

Nevertheless, the form of government very soon evolved
towards a parliamentary one, usually defined as one in
which the executive is responsible to the legislature through
a confidence relationship. To be more precise, the executives
during the Albertine Statute were still appointed by the king,
but they needed also, and probably first and foremost, the
confidence of the elected Chamber of Deputies.17 Similar to
what had happened a couple of centuries earlier in the
evolution of the British form of government, the king stopped
presiding over the executive’s meetings, thus granting a
special role to the emerging figure of the Prime Minister and
at the same time opening the space for deriving the
executive’s legitimacy also, and then exclusively, from the
elected Parliament.

Therefore, the influence of the elected Chamber of
Deputies and the autonomy of the Prime Minister changed
the form of government, which gradually evolved towards
parliamentarism, or, as some authors classified it, pseudoparliamentarism.18 The direction of this evolution and the de
facto replacement of the norm elaborated by the Albertine
Statute is undisputed. More debated is the moment at which
the system should be qualified as parliamentary.19 Also
debated is the question whether this form of government
could be classified as fully parliamentary at least at the end
16. Art. 5 Statuto Albertino (It.), translated in S.M. LINDSAY & L.S. ROWE,
CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF ITALY, TRANSLATED AND SUPPLIED WITH AN
INTRODUCTION AND NOTES 276 (1984).

17. See CARLO GHISALBERTI, STORIA COSTITUZIONALE D’ITALIA (1848–1994) 49
(2d ed. 2002); Vittorio Di Ciolo, Modificazioni “tacite” dello Statuto Albertino
(1848–1943) XXIII Rivista di Studi Politici 93–132 (2011); GIORGIO REBUFFA, LO
STATUTO ALBERTINO 83 (2003).
18. The reference is to GIUSEPPE MARANINI, STORIA DEL POTERE IN ITALIA
(1848–1967), AT 25 FF. (1st ed 1967) (seeing it as a synonym for assemblearism).

19. For a synthesis of the debate, see CARLO GHISALBERTI, supra note 17, at
49; Vittorio Di Ciolo, supra note 17, at 93–132; REBUFFA, supra note 17.
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of its evolution, that is, at the beginning of the twentieth
century. Those who oppose this reading and prefer to talk of
a pseudo-parliamentary regime remark that both the entry
into World War I and, even more clearly, Mussolini’s rise to
power, took place in ways that were more consistent with a
separation-of-powers system than with a parliamentary form
of government, that is, by relying on the will of the King more
than on that of the parliamentary majority.

One last element needs to be examined, regarding the
sources of law through which this evolution took place. The
most important are parliamentary rules and practices,
especially those non-written procedures through which the
Chamber of Deputies should vote in favor of the initial
confidence in Government.20 Also relevant are some pieces of
legislation, approved at the turn of the century, regarding
the role of the President of the Council—especially royal
decree n. 466/1901, the so-called “Zanardelli decree.”21
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROCEDURE IN THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC

To better understand the second example, drawn from
the experience of the Italian Republic started in 1946, it is
necessary to quickly recall the main feature of its
constitutional amendment procedure. In fact, the origins of
the Italian Republic and the need to avoid a repetition of the
fascist experience help to explain Italian Constitution’s
rigidity, assisted by a centralized system of judicial review of
legislation—similar to other constitutions approved in the
20. FABRIZIO ROSSI, SAGGIO SUL SISTEMA POLITICO DELL’ITALIA LIBERALE:
PROCEDURE FIDUCIARIE E SISTEMA DEI PARTITI FRA OTTO E NOVECENTO (2001);
ROMANO FERRARI ZUMBINI, La Torino del 1848–49 come Laboratorio
Costituzionale: La Nascita Spontanea della Fiducia Parlamentare, in LE CARTE E
LA STORIA, 2, 75–85 (2016).

21. PIETRO BARRERA, The First Institutional Reform: New Discipline in
Government Activity, in 4 ITALIAN POLITICS 20 (remarking how till the approval
of law no. 400/1988 this has been the only normative act devoted to regulating
the powers of the President of the Council).
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same years, for example in Germany.22 In the same way, the
procedure for constitutional amendment, as provided by
Article 138,23 mirrors the main features of the Italian
Constitution’s approval process.24 Two elements of the
constitutional amendment procedure recall the making of
the Italian Constitution. The constitution was approved by a
high majority of the Constituent Assembly in December 1947
without need for any further constitutional referendum
following that of June 1946 on the choice between a republic
and a monarchy; this took place simultaneously to the
elections of the same Constituent Assembly.25

First, the main and fundamental requirement for
writing as well as for amending the constitution is a wide
consensus within Parliament among the political parties.
The procedure for amending the constitution requires twice
as much approval from each parliamentary House as that
required for passing ordinary statutes.26 This means that
each House must vote twice on the very same bill to revise
the constitution. Whereas the first approval follows the
ordinary rules, the second prohibits any further modification
to the bill and requires higher majorities. As long as a
constitutional amendment receives a favorable vote in the
second deliberation—two-thirds of the members of each of
the two Houses—held at least three months after the first

22. VÌCTOR FERRERES COMELLA, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND DEMOCRATIC
VALUES: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 4, 6–8 (2009); MAARTJE DE VISSER,
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2015); VITTORIA
BARSOTTI, PAOLO G. CAROZZA, MARTA CARTABIA & ANDREA SIMONCINI, ITALIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN GLOBAL CONTEXT 11–35, 88, 217 (2016).
23. Art. 138 Costituzione [Cost.] (It) translated in BARSOTTI ET AL., supra note
22, at 270.

24. See TANIA GROPPI, FEDERALISMO E COSTITUZIONE: LA REVISIONE
COSTITUZIONALE NEGLI STATI FEDERALI 26 (2001) (indicating that this is rather
normal).
25. John Clarke Adams & Paolo Barile, The Implementation of the Italian
Constitution, 47 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 61, 61 (1953).
26. Art. 64, 72, 138, Costituzione [Cost.] (It) translated in BARSOTTI
supra note 22, at 254, 255, 270.

ET AL.,
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after the two houses have agreed on the same text, the
amendment is promulgated and enters into force without
any other requirement.27

Second, the possibility of a referendum is envisaged, but
only in the case where a wide parliamentary consensus is not
achieved. The constitutional referendum occurs upon
request, and only when a simple majority, but not two-thirds
of both houses is attained.28 So, in any case, the
constitutional amendment must be approved by a higher
standard that the simple majority of both houses required for
the approval of ordinary legislation. A referendum can be
requested within three months following the completion of
the parliamentary process by parliamentary minorities (at
least one-fifth of the members of each house), the citizens
(500,000 voters), or the Regions (five Regional Councils). 29 If
correctly requested, the constitutional referendum must take
place within the subsequent three months.30 The
constitutional referendum, either accepting or rejecting the
amendment, is valid irrespective of the percentage of the
voters that go to the polls.31 The same rule applied for the
aforementioned referendum of 1946. In part because it took
place concurrently with the first democratic elections after
the fascist regime, that referendum obtained a very high
turnout of eighty-nine percent of the electorate.
The necessity and sufficiency of a wide parliamentary
consensus were even clearer between 1948 and 1970, that is,
before the legislation required to implement all the kinds of
referendums provided by the constitution was enacted. 32
This means that all the constitutional amendments before

27. Art. 138, Costituzione [Cost.] (It) translated in BARSOTTI ET AL., supra note
22, at 270.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.

32. Legge 25 maggio 1970 n.352, G.U. June 15, 1970, n.147 (It.).
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1970 needed to attain a two-thirds vote in both Houses in the
second vote because the other way—absolute majority
followed by a requested constitutional referendum—was not
available.
The aforementioned procedures have not impeded a
certain number of constitutional amendments, aimed at
revising some specific provisions of the Constitution. By
these procedures, sixteen constitutional amendments have
been approved since 1948. The procedures have amended
twenty-nine articles (some of them more than once) and
suppressed four articles (all of them included in the Fifth
Title of the Second Part, on territorial autonomies), while no
brand-new article has been added into the text of the
constitution.

At the same time, through these procedures the approval
of a constitutional amendment aimed at more systematically
revising some elements of the constitutional structure has
been substantially impossible. The supermajority required
for the parliamentary approval of the amendment
strengthens the veto power.33 Additionally, the outcome of
the constitutional referendum is a further unknown.
Constitutional referendums have been held on three
occasions: in 2001 with the approval of a constitutional
revision on territorial autonomies proposed by a center-left
majority, in 2006 with the repeal of reform on the entire
second part of the constitution proposed by the Berlusconi
Government and its center-right majority, and in 2016 with
the rejection of the reform aiming at changing Parliament’s
structure proposed by the Renzi Government.34

33. Cf. Carlo Fusaro, Italy, in HOW CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE. A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 211, 211–234 (Dawn Oliver & Carlo Fusaro eds., 2011); Tania Groppi,
Constitutional Revision in Italy: A Marginal Instrument for Constitutional
Change, in ENGINEERING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
ON EUROPE, CANADA AND THE USA 203, 208 (Xenophon Contiades ed., 2013).

34. See QUIRINO CAMERLENGO, LA COSTITUZIONE ITALIANA: COMMENTO
ARTICOLO PER ARTICOLO (Francesco Clementi et al. eds.) (forthcoming 2018).
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III. SECOND EXAMPLE: THE RATIFICATION BY ORDINARY
LEGISLATION OF THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY

Consistent with Albert’s thesis, the difficulties in
achieving constitutional amendments—especially due to the
high parliamentary majority required—help explain the
recourse to sub-constitutional sources of law for objectives
that also would have required a constitutional provision.
Arguably, the main changes of the Italian Constitution did
not happen through formal constitutional amendments.
Deep and informal constitutional changes, inter alia, on the
sources of law, economic relations, and balance between
Parliament and Government, derived indeed from Italy’s
membership first in the European Community and then in
the European Union (EU).

As clearly stated by the Court of Justice of the EU, EU
treaties and EU law more generally prevail over national law
and even national constitutional norms since the 1960s.35 It
is well-known that this same principle has been accepted by
most Member States, mainly through the case law of
constitutional courts recognizing the primacy of EU law,36
and in some cases keeping the possibility of invoking
“counter-limits” where EU law infringed upon the supreme
principles of the national legal order.37
35. See the landmark Costa judgement (Case 6/64) of the European Court of
Justice (“the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could
not, because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal
provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its character as
community law and without the legal basis of the community itself being called
into question.” ).

36. See ALFONSO CELOTTO & TANIA GROPPI, Diritto UE e diritto nazionale:
primauté vs. controlimiti, RIV.IT.DIR.PUBBL.COM 1309 (2004).

37. The expression “counter-limits” (“controlimiti”), although widely used in
scholarly debate has been used by the Italian Constitutional Court just once. See
Cass., 22 Ottobre 2014, Race. Uff. Corte Cost. 2014, CL, 1 169, 187; Paolo Barile,
Il Cammino Comunitario della Corte, in GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE 2406
(1973) (commenting on the decision no. 183/1973). On the “controlimiti” doctrine,
see MARTA CARTABIA, PRINCIPI INVIOLABILI E INTEGRAZIONE EUROPEA 130–313
(1995), and recently, PIETRO FARAGUNA, AI CONFINI DELLA COSTITUZIONE: PRINCIPI

1050

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

Different from what happened in many other EU
Member States,38 in Italy the ratification (and the execution)
of the international treaties founding the European
Communities and all their subsequent reforms from the
1950s until the Treaty of Lisbon did not require any
constitutional amendment and took place through ordinary
legislation. The effect of national legislation giving way for
EU law was obtained, indeed, through constitutional
interpretation. Both the legislature, in ratifying founding
treaties, and the Constitutional Court, in ruling on the
compliance of EU law with constitutional principles, relied
on the general clause embedded in Article 11 of the Italian
Constitution on openness to the international order and the
consequent limitations of sovereignty.39

The choice not to amend the constitution or to include a
“European clause,” instead relying on the general clause
embedded in Article 11 was originally taken by the
legislature based on the argument that the European
integration process achieved international peace and justice
among nations.40 Essentially, it is derived from political
reasons; the opposition of the communist and socialist
parties made it practically impossible to reach the
supermajority then necessary to amend the Constitution. 41
Thus, under the wide umbrella of Article 11, Italy’s

SUPREMI E IDENTITÀ COSTITUZIONALE 72–113 (2015).

38. See Fusaro, supra note 33, at 223 (stating that “Italy is the only European
nation with a textual Constitution which has never been amended in order to
allow the ratification of any European Treaty . . .”). For a wider comparative
analysis, see generally National Constitutional Avenues for Further EU
Integration, PARL. EUR. DOC. (PE 493.046) 263 (2014) [hereinafter EU Integration
Study].
39. Fusaro, supra note 33, at 225

40. SERGIO BARTOLE, INTERPRETAZIONI E TRASFORMAZIONI DELLA COSTITUZIONE
276 (2004).

REPUBBLICANA

41. AUGUSTO BARBERA, COSTITUZIONE DELLA REPUBBLICA ITALIANA in 8
ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO: ANNALI 263–358, at 352 (2015); ANTONIO VARSORI, LA
CENERENTOLA D’EUROPA? L’ITALIA E L’INTEGRAZIONE EUROPEA DAL 1947 AD OGGI
34 (2010).
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participation in the EU has relied essentially on legislative
means alone, starting from the authorization of the
ratification of the first European treaties,42 soon confirmed
by the Italian Constitutional Court. Even though it took
some time to find a way to combine the dualist approach of
the Italian legal order with the Court of Justice’s early
affirmation of the primacy and direct effect,43 the Italian
Constitutional Court never called for constitutional reform
in order to participate in the integration process, affirming
the possibility of coping with it by interpreting the
constitution in force.44

The same model was then followed for authorizing the
ratification of all further treaty revisions.45 A bill was
submitted by the Government and approved as quickly and
plainly as possible by a large parliamentary majority—which
enlarged even more as the parties of the left became
gradually more in favor of European integration—and no
referendum or prior check of compatibility with the Italian
Constitution was required.46 This happened again with the
Treaty of Lisbon, but this was also because the Italian
Parliament had been among the first to ratify the
constitutional treaty three years earlier.47 This helps to
explain why there was no negative vote cast or abstention on
the bill authorizing its ratification in the Senate (on July 23,
2008) or the Chamber of Deputies (on July 31, 2008). If no
42. Legge 14 Ottobre 1957, n. 1203, G.U. Dec. 23, 1957, n.317.

43. See Barile, supra note 37. See also Federico Sorrentino, La Costituzione
Italiana di Fronte al Processo di Integrazione Europea, 13 Quaderni
Costituzionali 71–112, at 73 ff. (1993); Marta Cartabia, The Italian Constitutional
Court and the Relationship Between the Italian Legal System and the European
Union, in THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS: DOCTRINE AND
JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL CHANGE IN ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT, 133–46 (Ann-Marie
Slaughter et al. eds., 1998).
44. BARSOTTI ET AL., supra note 22, at 205.

45. Id. at 208.

46. Id. at 206.

47. Nicola Lupo & Giovanni Piccirilli, Conclusion to THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT
EUROPEAN UNION 317, 326 (Lupo-Piccirilli ed. 2017).

IN THE
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constitutional amendment was needed to ratify the
constitutional treaty, the same held for a treaty like Lisbon,
which, at least formally intended to downgrade the
constitutional impact (as well as some constitutional
rhetoric) of its immediate predecessor.

In more general terms, this example seems to confirm
that the recourse to quasi-constitutional amendments might
be driven by the difficulty of formal amendment procedures.
However, this difficulty should be measured not just in a
contingent way at a certain moment in constitutional
history, but as a permanent feature of legal order. Otherwise,
it would be hardly understandable why Italy, even with
extremely high consensus on EU membership and its
transformation into a federal state,48 has never ratified a
European treaty through a constitutional amendment.
IV. THE ITALIAN DEBATE ON “TACIT CONSTITUTIONAL
MODIFICATIONS” AND THE “NON-TRIVIAL RISKS” OF “QUASICONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS”

The two examples from the Italian constitutional
experience above confirm that the new proposed
classification of quasi-constitutional amendments is very
useful and clarifying.

Even the current situation—subsequent to the rejection
of the constitutional amendment aimed at reforming the
Italian symmetrical bicameralism by the constitutional
referendum held on December 4, 2016—could pave the way

48. EU Integration Study, supra note 38, at 157 (discussing an advisory
referendum held in 1989 that showed the high level of consensus around the
European integration process. Through it, Italian citizens were asked —on the
same day in which they were called to elect the European Parliament—whether
they wanted to transform the European Communities into a Union, with a
Government responsible before the European Parliament, and to confer to the
European Parliament a mandate to draft a project of a European Constitution.
The result confirmed the wide pro-European orientation of the Italian public
opinion at that time, as 88.1 percent of the voters gave a positive reply (with the
high turnout of 81 percent)).
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to further quasi-constitutional amendments.49 The rejection
clearly showed the great difficulty of any constitutional
reform of the current Italian Parliament: in the final
referendum, veto powers could easily ally with each other
and defeat any attempt of constitutional reform, especially
when it deals with a controversial issue such as the design of
a Senate with different powers than the lower house. After
such a defeat and the unresolved debate on a constitutional
reform of the symmetrical bicameralism that has lasted since
the 1980s, with all the main political parties recognizing the
need of a series of institutional changes, constitutional
innovation processes must follow in ways other than the
procedures for constitutional amendments in Article 138 at
least in the short-term and probably also in the mediumterm.50

It is best to conclude by summarizing an academic debate
that developed in Italy in the 1950s to confirm not only that
the phenomena that the category of quasi-constitutional

49. In classifying this attempted constitutional reform as a “constitutional
amendment,” I am dissenting from Albert’s view that it is a case of “constitutional
dismemberment.” See Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment and
Dismemberment, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 3 (forthcoming 2018). For a discussion that
shares Albert’s opinion, see Lorenza Violini & Antonia Baraggia, The Italian
Constitutional Challenge: An Overview of the Upcoming Referendum, INT’L J.
CONST. L. BLOG (Dec. 2, 2016), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/12/the-italianconstitutional-challenge-an-overview-of-the-upcoming-referendum. In fact, to
use Albert’s definitions, it would not have altered “the identity, the fundamental
values or the architecture of the constitution,” but could be assessed—at least
according to its promoters and supporters—as “an arrangement made to better
achieve the purpose of the existing constitution.” Albert, supra. Although it would
have modified a high number of constitutional provisions (most of them just to
coordinate them with the reform of symmetrical bicameralism), it would have left
untouched the whole first part of the Constitution (on the rights and duties of the
citizens) and would not have directly touched upon the relationships between
Government and Parliament.

50. See generally Quaderno 2015–2016 IL FILANGIERI 1–331 (2017) (which is a
special issue on Il Parlamento dopo il Referendum Costituzionale); Giuditta
Brunelli, Lo “Spazio” dei Regolamenti Parlamentari nelle Riforme Costituzionale
(2016), in OSSERVATORIO SULLE FONTI 11–12 (2017), www.osservatoriosullefonti.it
(citing SILVANO TOSI, MODIFICAZIONI TACITE DELLA COSTITUZIONE 39–40, 94
(1959).); Nicola Lupo, On the Failed Reform of the Italian Senate in Constitutional
Issues and Challenges in Hungary and Italy (forthcoming).
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amendment aims at describing are indeed far from new as
they were already taking place then, but also that scholars
have already reflected somewhat on the features of these
phenomena.

In Italy the debate focused on a slightly different
category called “tacit constitutional modifications”
(“modificazioni tacite della Costituzione”).51 The category,
introduced by Pierandrei, was defined as including “acts or
facts able to in some way vary the function of constitutional
bodies, although leaving formally unaltered the norms that
rule them.”52 However, Tosi then profitably applied this
category to the so-called parliamentary law (the
parliamentary rules and procedures already discussed), but
also sharply criticized its features.53 The main criticism
focused on the positivist argument that in a system with a
rigid constitution it would not be proper to speak of tacit
modification: these phenomena, he argued, are either
outcomes of interpretative evolution of the constitution, and
therefore legal, or else they are violations of the constitution,
which are always illegal.54
Some of these same scholars’ discussions also concerned
the possibility of applying the category to flexible
constitutions, with obvious reference to the U.K. legal order,
admitted by Pierandrei and normally excluded by Tosi.55
Tosi, however, recognized tacit modifications to a certain
extent, especially in the relations between Government and
Parliament as they require some dynamic elements so long
as they do not alter the constitution’s guarantees and the
51. FRANCO PIERANDREI, La Corte Costituzionale e le ‘Modificazioni Tacite’
della Costituzione, in 4 SCRITTI GIURIDICI IN ONORE DI A. SCIALOJA, 315 (1953).
52. FRANCO PIERANDREI, La Corte Costituzionale e le ‘Modificazioni Tacite’
della Costituzione, in 4 SCRITTI GIURIDICI IN ONORE DI A. SCIALOJA, 315 (1953).
53. TOSI, supra note 50, at 5

54. Id. at 5 (adding that theft, even when reiterated under the sleepy
guardianship of the policemen, is something different from the repeal of the
property right).
55. PIERANDREI, supra note 51, at 332; TOSI, supra note 50, at 12.
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This debate, often referenced in the following decades, 57
was also explicitly linked to the one regarding the use of
other concepts that similarly aimed at considering elements
of political dynamics arising outside of the constitutional
text, such as the elasticity of the constitution, 58 and, most of
all, the constitution “in a material sense” (sometimes called
the “material constitution”).59 That category, proposed by
Mortati during the fascist era and then again with the
constitution (to which he significantly contributed as a
member of the Constituent Assembly), has been by far the
most successful, not only among legal scholars, but also
among historians and political scientists, and even in public
debate, although it is extremely controversial.60
CONCLUSION

In synthesis, the Italian academic debate on these very
similar concepts testifies to the emergence of what can
probably be considered the two main “non-trivial risks” of
quasi-constitutional amendments. As Albert defines them:
first, to create “a mismatch between constitutional design
and political practice that constitutional actors can in turn
56. TOSI, supra note 50, at 38.

57. See, e.g., CLAUDIO DE CESARE, Le Modificazioni Tacite della Costituzione
Nell’attuale Sistema Parlamentare Italiano, in 1 RASSEGNA PARLAMENTARE 121–
50 (2010); RENATO IBRIDO, L’INTERPRETAZIONE DEL DIRITTO PARLAMENTARE:
POLITICA E DIRITTO NEL “PROCESSO” DI RISOLUZIONE DEI CASI REGOLAMENTARI 127
(2015). More recently, see generally Brunelli, supra note 50.

58. Luigi Rossi, La “Elasticità” dello Statuto Italiano, in 1 SCRITTI GIURIDICI
IN ONORE DI SANTI ROMANO 70 (1940). For a more recent discussion, see GIULIANO
AMATO, L’ELASTICITÀ DELLE COSTITUZIONI RIGIDE, 1–2 (2016) , http://www.nomosleattualitaneldiritto.it/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Amato_Nomos1-2016.pdf.
59. COSTANTINO MORTATI, LA COSTITUZIONE IN SENSO MATERIALE (1998).

60. See Gustavo Zagrebelsky, introduction to LA COSTITUZIONE IN SENSO
MATERIALE supra note 59 (recalling the applause with which an assembly of
Italian constitutional law scholars in 1994, at the beginning of the Berlusconi
years, reacted to the proposal by Paladin to abandon in toto the concept of the
constitution in a material sense).
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exploit for political expedient purposes” and secondly, to
“undermine[] the constitution itself and the very purpose of
codification.”61

These risks are why this category, as well as the similar
notion of the “material constitution,” should be handled with
extreme care, especially by constitutional law scholars. It is
clear that the use of similar categories risks encouraging
politics and politicians to diminish the role and the weight of
the constitution, or at least of the constitutional text, which
would be in contrast with what is often seen as one of the
methodological
guidelines
of
constitutional
law
62
scholarship : interpreting the constitution magis ut valeat,
that is, in a way that maximizes its relevance and its
effectiveness.

61. Albert, supra note 1, at 742. The first “nontrivial risk” identified by Albert
seems indeed slightly less dangerous and consists of blurring “the line separating
the constitutional from the non-constitutional.” Id. at 742.

62. VEZIO CRISAFULLI, 11 LA COSTITUZIONE E LE SUE DISPOSIZIONI DI PRINCIPIO
(1952); GUSTAVO ZAGREBELSKY, 5 LA VIRTÙ DEL DUBBIO (2007).

